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Abstract
In the recent World Men’s Basketball Championships in Indianapolis, Team USA found out
painfully that the international game is very different from what they play at home and that the
gap between USA Basketball and the rest of the world has been closing. While the United States’
losses might have a significant impact on how the country will prepare for the 2004 Olympics in
Athens and on how Americans train youngsters to play basketball, their teachings go beyond bas-
ketball. The international harmonization process is a game with different rules, different officials,
and players with different visions and mindsets. By watching how players interact with rules, of-
ficials, and other players, one therefore could gain insight into globalization and the international
harmonization process. Team USA’s recent loss might be a painful lesson to Americans, but it
provides a beneficial lesson to all of us who are involved in intellectual property and international
trade.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States finally lost! After winning fifty-eight con-
secutive games over ten years with stars from the National Bas-
ketball Association ("NBA"), Team USA finally lost to Argentina,
a team consisting mainly of players who would be deemed un-
qualified to play in the NBA. 1 Showcasing fundamentals and
teamwork, the Argentines beat the U.S. men's basketball team by
running flawless pick-and-rolls and backdoor cuts. No spectacu-
lar dunks. No shake and bake. No in-your-face crossovers. Pure
basics.
A game later, in the quarterfinals, the U.S. team lost again
to Yugoslavia, blowing a ten-point lead with three minutes left in
regulation time.' What was once idolized as the Dream Team
has now become the "nightmare team." Before exiting the tour-
nament, Team USA lost again to Spain, leaving the players in
shock, disappointment, embarrassment, and shame.3 For the
first time since NBA players represented the red, white, and
blue, Team USA failed to earn a medal in international competi-
tion. Worse still, the recent team produced the worst finish ever
* Acting Assistant Professor of Law, Executive Director, Intellectual Property Law
Program & Deputy Director, Howard M. Squadron Program in Law, Media & Society,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; Research Associate, Pro-
gramme in Comparative Media Law & Policy, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University
of Oxford. This Article is expanded from Peter K. Yu, Hoops 'n Harmonization, IP
WORLDWIDE, Nov. 2002, at 16. The Author dedicates this Article to all those who have
patience with him as a player, a teammate, a coach, a referee, and a MagicJohnson fan.
1. See Mike Wise, U.S. Team Is Big on Hype, Not Results, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at
D 1; Harvey Araton, The Inevitable Finally Happens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at D2.
2. Harvey Araton, U.S. Is Eliminated from World Championships, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2002, at D1.
3. U.S. Loses to Spain This Time, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, Sec. 8, at 6.
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by a U.S. basketball team, sixth place, and the United States
must qualify in order to participate in the 2004 Olympics.'
To many, the United States' losses were difficult to accept
and even more difficult to explain.5 The game was not marred
by politics, as was the infamous USA-USSR final in the 1972
Olympics in Munich.6 It also was not affected by the NBA strike,
as were the 1998 World Championships, in which CBA, overseas,
and college players replaced the original NBA selections and lost
in the semifinals.7 The U.S. players could not even complain of
other teams having home court advantage, for the champion-
ships were held in Indianapolis, deep in the heart of the Ameri-
can basketball kingdom.8
True, some of the marquee players in the NBA, like Kobe
Bryant, Tim Duncan, Kevin Garnett, Jason Kidd, Allen Iverson,
and Shaquille O'Neal, did not play in the championships.' It is
4. See Tom Enlund, Poor Finish Creates More Work, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Sept. 10,
2002, at 8C (noting that "[o] ne of the consequences of finishing a disappointing sixth
in the World Basketball Championship is that the United States ... will have to qualify
to play in the 2004 Olympics").
5. But see Alexander Wolff, The Decline of U.S. Dominance, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED ON-
LINE (Sept. 9, 2002), at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/insidegame/alexander_
wolff/news/2002/09/09/hoop-life/ (tracing the decline of U.S. dominance in basket-
ball).
6. See USA Basketball, Games of the XXth Olympiad, at http://www.usabasketball.
com/history/olyhistory_1972.html (describing the controversial USA-USSR final in the
1972 Olympics).
7. See Malcolm Moran, Tough Task Ahead for USA, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2002, at 2C.
8. Araton, supra n.1.
9. One commentator criticized the recent U.S. team for its lack of championship
experience:
Of the dozen on the roster, only Indiana's Reggie Miller has played for a
championship. Jay Williams, Chicago's first-round pick from Duke, hasn't
played an NBA game, and Andre Miller never won more than 30 games as a
Cavalier. Jermaine O'Neal joined the Pacers after they went to the NBA
Finals, and Antonio Davis was discarded the year before.
Phoenix's Shawn Marion and the Los Angeles Clippers' Elton Brand were
unable to play Thursday night because of injuries. But again, neither has en-
joyed significant team success in the NBA.
Essentially, USA Basketball pulled 12 guys together and told them to go
play for Bucks coach George Karl, who had never run an operation like this
but believed he deserved the opportunity.
Jeffrey Denberg, USA Can't Assume Wins Will Be Easy, ATLANTA J.- CONST., Sept. 8, 2002,
at 4F. Other commentators disagreed:
Seven guys on this roster (Antonio Davis, Baron Davis, Elton Brand, Reggie
Miller, Paul Pierce, Michael Finley and Jermaine O'Neal) have all been in at
least one NBA all-star game. Ben Wallace was the NBA's defensive player of
the year. Duke's Jay Williams was the NCAA national player of the year. An-
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also true that the team did not have enough practice, playing
only two exhibition games before the tournament.'l However,
compared with the 1992 Dream Team that beat every team by an
average margin of 43.8 points"' with similar preparation,' 2 the
losses tell us more about the reducing gap between U.S. basket-
ball and the rest of the world' 3 than about the U.S. team's lack of
preparation. In fact, as Coach George Karl acknowledged, the
defeat represents, in a strange way, "a celebration of basketball
... [and] America should be proud of that."'4
dre Miller led his Utah team to the Final Four. Only Raef LaFrentz and Shawn
Marion are what you'd call undecorated. Everybody else has credentials.
Whether they're into this competition is another story.
Michael Wilbon, Basketball's New World Order, WASh. POST, Sept. 6, 2002, at DI; see also
J.D. Adande, It's a lop by U.S. Against Yugoslavia, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at 1 (noting
that the current U.S. team "still included three NBA All-Stars (Paul Pierce, Baron Davis
and Elton Brand), the league's defensive player of the year (Wallace) and the most
improved player (Jermaine O'Neal)"); Barbara Barker, A Collapsing Zone, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 15, 2002, at C4 ("It's not about talent. There was enough talent on that team to
win it all. How many of those guys from Argentina and Yugoslavia would even make the
U.S. team?" (quoting Bill Walton, ESPN analyst and former National Basketball Associa-
tion ("NBA") player)); Bob Ryan, There's No Longer a World of Difference, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 7, 2002, at El (contending that the U.S. team consisted of virtually all those play-
ers who could have played for the United States when one accepted the fact that the
ultra-marquee players would not participate in the tournament).
10. MarcJ. Spears, What's Ahead for USA Basketball? Rebound, DENVER PoST, Sept. 8,
2002, at Cl.
11. USA Basketball, Games of the XXV Olympiad, at http://www.usabasketball.com/
histoiy/olyhistory_1992.html (reporting the statistics of the 1992 Dream Team).
12. SeeJonathan Feigen, What's Next?, HousToN CHRON., Sept. 7, 2002, at 4:
The original Dream Team was blessed with many of the most intuitive players
- Magic johnson, Larry Bird, Michael Jordan, John Stockton, Karl Malone,
Charles Barkley - in the history of the sport. Their genius was so great they
could easily make up for a lack of training for the international game. Their
heirs increasingly have not.
Id.
13. This gap generally refers to the dominating performance of the U.S. men's
basketball team. Although the U.S. women's basketball team is one of the best in the
world and has not lost in international competition since 1994, the gap between the
U.S. and foreign teams in the women's competition is not as great as that in the men's
competition. For example, in the recent World Women's Basketball Championships,
the United States beat Russia in the final by only five points. Joseph Kahn, U.S. Defeats
Russia to Win World Title, N.Y. TIMIS, Sept. 26, 2002, at D6.
14. Moran, supra n.7 (quoting George Karl, coach of the 2002 USA Men's Basket-
ball Team):
I'm not sure it's the end of an era as much as it's a celebration of basket-
ball. A lot of the countries now love the game and play the game with a great
deal of passion and a great deal of spirit. In a strange way, America should be
proud of that.
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No doubt, these recent losses will be a wake-up call to the
U.S. basketball community. They will have a significant impact
on how USA Basketball prepares for the 2004 Olympics in Ath-
ens. These losses also might affect how America trains its youth
to play basketball, probably by reemphasizing fundamental skills
and teamwork principles 5 and by relaxing restrictions on the
time coaches can spend on training players. 6 However, the
losses teach us more than basketball. They offer valuable lessons
on globalization and the international harmonization process.
LESSON 1: THE RULES
Harmonization is different from Americanization.17 Policy-
15. Coach George Karl criticized the manner in which American youth was taught
basketball and explained the difference between the U.S. and international basketball
players:
European and international basketball players have been shown that their atti-
tude and professionalism and intensity has maybe surpassed our young play-
ers' intensity. How do we wake up American basketball? This year's draft
woke up some. The reason we're drafting international players is because of
their professionalism, their maturity at a young age, their work ethic in being
in the gym 10-11 months out of the year where our AAU babies don't even go
in the gym half the year. The more we play the all-star American street game,
flash, and style, the more chance we have of getting beat by a fundamentally
solid basketball team that is going to give you the work ethic, intensity, going
to get the extra possession, going to outwork you.
Peter May, There Are Good Reasons for US' Bad Showing, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 2002, at
CI 3; see als0Jim Alexander, Back to Basics for U.S., PREss-ENTERPRISE, Sept. 10, 2002, at C8
(questioning whether "basketball's Holy Trinity - the dunk, the three-pointer and the
crossover - come back to bite [the U.S. players]" and arguing that USA Basketball
"must take more of a proactive role in development of young players"); Marty Burns,
Now Wiat?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED ONLINE (Sept. 6, 2002), at http://sportsillustrated.
cnn.com/insidegame/martyburns/news/2002/09/06/burnsnowwhat/ (questioning
whether U.S. players learn to play the game the right way); Isean Deveney, How to Put
the Dream Back in Team USA, SPOWRING NEWS, Sept. 16, 2002, at 74 (criticizing National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") for being "so bogged down in its focus on
rules that it lost sight of one of its most important duties: to ensure that its players are
properly taught the game"); Jonathan Feigen, World Championships Fiasco Has U.S. Seek-
ing Remedies, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 9, 2002, at 2 [hereinafter Feigen, World Champion-
ships Fiasco] (noting that "[m]uch of the blame has been placed on the entire system
that covets, rewards and encourages individual skills at the expense of fundamentals
and team principles"); Brian Meehan, Basketball Is a Better Game Outside the NBA, OREGO-
NIAN, Sept. 17, 2002, at D I (criticizing the flaws of the NBA game); Sam Smith, U.S. Goes
Down Again, Cii. TRIB., Sept. 6, 2002, Sports Sec., at I (quoting the Spanish coach's
remarks that Pau Gasol, a Spanish import to the NBA, is no longer as complete a player
as he was before he joined the NBA).
16. See Deveney, supra n.15 (contending that "[r]estrictions on practice time in the
offseason and during the season are hurting coaches' ability to teach fundamentals").
17. Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the
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makers sometimes confuse national policy preferences with in-
ternational norms. I8  The fact that the game of basketball
originated from the United States' 9 does not mean that the in-
ternational community will follow American rules.
Undeniably, the International Basketball Federation
("FIBA"), the international governing body of basketball, has in-
stituted changes to harmonize its game with that of the NBA.
For example, in the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona, the ban on
alley-oops in international games was confusing and counterin-
tuitive to U.S. players and the American audience. Taking note
of this difference, the FIBA suspended the ban in the 1994
World Championships and subsequently eliminated the ban."'
Most recently, the FIBA made revolutionary rules changes to
speed up its game and to meet the needs of television broad-
Twenty-First Century, 50 Am. U. L. REv. 131, 233-34 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to
Partners] (noting that one should not confuse an internaional intellectual property
regime with a universalized Western intellectual property regime); see also Peter K. Yu,
Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U. S.-China
Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 84 (2001) [hereinafter Yu, Piracy,
Prejudice, and Perspectives].
18. David M. Lampton, A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the Global
Order, in LIVING WITH CHINA: U.S./CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 120,
133 (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1997) (criticizing the American government for confusing its
national policy preferences with international norms); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra
n.17, at 234 (criticizing the U.S. government for ignoring the interests of other coun-
tries, in particular less developed countries); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspective, supra
n.17, at 84 (same); see also ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 80 (1996) (noting that "the U.S. drive for stronger protection of
IP is more in the direction of devising a new legal regime that answers to its needs than
to accommodate within the present conventions upcoming global trends in technology,
creation, and use"); Robert Burrell, A Case Study in Cultural Imperialism: The Imposition of
Copyright on China by the West, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETiIcS 195, 198 (Lionel
Bently & Spyros M. Maniatis eds., 1998) (noting that the Western approach toward
China "fails to respect other voices and other traditions and instead posits the moral
superiority of a value system which is far more recent than the tradition it seeks to
condemn").
19. See Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame, James Naismith Biography, at
http://www.hoophall.com/halloffamers/Naismith.htm. In 1891, Dr. James Naismith
invented the game of basketball while working at the School for Christian Workers. Id.
The game started with eighteen men in a YMCA gymnasium in Springfield, Massachu-
setts. Id.; see also WALTER LAFEBER, MICIHAEL JORDAN AND THE NEW GLOBAL CAPITALISM
33-41 (1999) (discussing James Naismith's legacy).
20. See David Aldridge, NBA Players Learn New Rules, Each Other, WASiH. POST, June
23, 1992, at E5 (describing the prohibition of alley-oops in International Basketball
Federation ("FIBA") rules); Phil Taylor, Yes, It Was a Joke, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 22,
1994, at 38 (stating that FIBA suspended its prohibition of alley-oop passes for the 1994
world championships).
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casts. 2 1 Under the new rules, an international game no longer
has two twenty-minute halves, but four ten-minute quarters,
thanks in part to the NBA.22 In addition, the shot clock was re-
duced from thirty to twenty-four seconds, 2' and only one free
throw, instead of two, is awarded for every technical foul com-
mitted.2 4
Notwithstanding these changes, there are limits to the
NBA's ability to export its rules. In the past decade, the NBA has
made repeated attempts to amend its rules to accelerate offense,
encourage ball movement, and increase its appeal to fans.2 1 In
2001 alone, it instituted four major rules changes,26 including
elimination of illegal defense rules,2 7 institution of a more strin-
gent defensive three-second rule,28 reduction of time during
which a team can bring the ball up to the front court,29 and re-
21. See FIBA's New Rule to Speed Up the Game, HINDU, Oct. 12, 2000 (discussing the
FIBA rules changes in 2000).
22. See id.; see also FIBA, Official Basketball Rules for Men and Women art. 17.1
(2000) [hereinafter FIBA Rules], available at http://www.fiba.com (stipulating that
"[tihe game shall consist of four (4) periods of ten (10) minutes").
23. See FIBA's New Rule to Speed Up the Game, supra n.21; see also FIBA Rules, supra
n.22, art. 39.1.1 (stipulating that "[w]henever a player gains control of a live ball on the
court, a shot for a field goal shall be attempted by his team within twenty-four (24)
seconds").
24. See FIBA's New Rule to Speed Up the Game, supra n.21; see also FIBA Rules, supra
n.22, art. 49.2.2 (stipulating one free throw as the penalty for committing a technical
foul).
25. See, e.g., Michael Arace, New Rules Are Radically Changing the NBA, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1994, at CIO (discussing NBA rules changes in 1994); Chris Young, NBA Rules
Changes for 1997-98, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 30, 1997, atJ2 (discussing NBA rules changes
in 1997); David Wharton, Trying to Stop a Holding Pattern, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999, at S3
(discussing NBA rules changes in 1999); NBA Changes Rules and Approves New Owners,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 12, 2000 (discussing NBA rules changes in 2000); NBA
Announces Rule Changes, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug. 15, 2000, (discussing further NBA
rules changes in 2000); Mark Heisler, NBA Goes into Zone ofIts Own, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13,
2001, at D1 (discussing NBA rules changes in 2001).
26. See Heisler, supra n.25; see also NBA, Rush on Rule Changes, at http://www.nba.
com/preview200l/rushnewrules.html (presenting an interview with Ed Rush, Director
of Officiating of the NBA, who discussed the 2001 NBA rules changes).
27. By eliminating the rules on illegal defense, the league reduced isolation plays
and permits a wide variety of defensive strategies, which range from man-to-man cover-
age to zone defense and from box-and-one to 2-1-2.
28. See Official NBA Rules of the National Basketball Association, Rule 10, Sec. VIII
(2002) [hereinafter NBA Rules], available at http://www.nba.com/analysis/rulesin-
dex.html (instituting the defensive three-second rule). The rule prohibits a defensive
player from staying in the lane for more than three seconds unless he is within six feet
of an offensive player. Id.
29. See NBA Rules, supra n.28, Rule 10, Sec. IX (instituting the eight-second rule).
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definition of "incidental contact." '' While the NBA justified
these rules changes in light of the large number of low-scoring
games and reduced viewership, the international game does not
have similar needs nor does it require similar changes. In fact,
some of the NBA rules changes might not be suitable for coun-
tries abroad, as these countries do not have as many slashers and
dunkers as the NBA does.
Harmonization is a two-way street. While the NBA is actively
exporting its concepts and style of play abroad, it also has im-
ported some aspects of the international game, sometimes to the
league's disappointment. A case in point is the reduction of the
three-point line." The league soon found the change disap-
pointing and reverted the three-point line back to its original
dimension three years later.12 Most recently, the league elimi-
nated the rules on illegal defense and permitted, for the first
time, zone defense, which until now was one of the major differ-
ences between the NBA and the international game.3 Because
the change has been in effect for only a year, it is hard to assess
its impact on the league or to predict whether this change will be
permanent.
So far, many of the international rules remain different
from those used in the NBA." 4 For example, the international
game uses only two referees, as compared to three in the NBA.3"
The eight-second rule gives teams only eight seconds, as compared to ten in the old
rules, to bring the ball up to the front court. Id. The goal of this rule is to prevent
players from slowing down the game by "walking" the ball up the court. Id.
30. See NBA Rules, supra n.28, App. II (stipulating that "[t]he mere fact that con-
tact occurs does not necessarily constitute a foul"). By doing so, the league cut down on
touch fouls, thus rewarding offensive players who demonstrate quickness, speed, and
balance. Rush on Rule Changes, supra n.26.
31. Arace, supra n.25 (noting that the NBA has moved the three-point line from
twenty-three foot nine at the top of the key and twenty-two feet in the corners to a
uniform twenty-two feet).
32. Young, supra n.25.
33. Dick Scanlon, Rules Changes Haven't Affected the League, LEDGER, Feb. 3, 2002, at
C4 (noting that the abolition of rules against zone defense "seemed like the most dras-
tic rules change in a half century").
34. The international rules are also different from those used in the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"). For a comparison of the rules between an inter-
national game and the NBA and the NCAA, see Rules of the Game, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Aug. 28, 2002, at 28H.
35. Compare FIBA Rules, supra n.22, art. 4.1 (requiring officiating by a referee and
an umpire while permitting the use of an additional umpire), with NBA Rules, supra
n.28, Rule 2, Sec. I(a) (requiring officiating by a crew chief and two referees).
20031 THE HARMONIZATION GAME
The three-point line is closer to the basket than the one used in
the NBA, making long-distance shooting a more important as-
pect of the game. 6 The three-second lane is trapezoid-shaped37
and therefore penalizes post-up players who have limited shoot-
ing range.38 Due to the shorter duration, 9 the international
game allows only five fouls, with personal and technical fouls
counting toward the maximum limit." By contrast, the NBA
rules permit six personal fouls,4' do not include technical fouls
in the calculation,42 and cover monetary penalties.43 Moreover,
the FIBA requires players to shoot free throws within five
seconds, while the NBA doubles the time given to a free-throw
shooter." Compared to the NBA, the international game has
more lenient rules on goal tending and basketball interference,
allowing players to touch the ball after it hits the rim.4 5
In light of these differences, the U.S. players were under-
standably confused by the international rules and affected by the
style of play of which international teams are capable.46 How-
36. Compare FIBA Rules, supra n.22, art. 2.4.5 (stipulating that the three-point field
goal area consists of "[a] semicircle of 6.25 m from the outer edge to the centre"), with
NBA Rules, supra n.28, Rule 1, Sec. I(d) (stipulating that the three-point field goal area
"has parallel lines 3' from the sidelines, extending from the baseline and an arc of 23'9"
from the middle of the basket which inter-sects the parallel lines").
37. Compare FIBA Rules, supra n.22, art. 2.4.3 (situating the dimensions of the trap-
ezoid-shaped restricted area), with NBA Rules, supra n.28, Rule 1, Sec. I (stipulating the
dimensions of the rectangular-shaped restricted area).
38. Wilbon, supra n.9 (noting that "trapezoid lane leaves [an American player]
posting up a defender three to four feet farther from the basket than he is in the NBA,
and therefore out of his limited range").
39. The international game is eight minutes shorter than an NBA game.
40. See FIBA Rules, supra n.22, art. 54.1 (stipulating that "[a] player who has com-
mitted five (5) fouls, either personal and/or technical, shall be informed thereof and
must leave the game immediately").
41. See NBA Rules, supra n.28, Rule 3, Sec. I(a) (disqualifying players upon receiv-
ing the sixth personal foul).
42. See id. Rule 12 (differentiating between technical and personal fouls).
43. Id. Rule 12, Sec. VIII (stipulating monetary penalties).
44. Compare FIBA Rules, supra n.22, art. 57.4.3 (requiring that free-throw shooters
"release the ball within five (5) seconds from the time it is placed at his disposal by the
official"), with NBA Rules, supra n.28, Rule 9, Sec. III (situating that "[e]ach free throw
attempt shall be made within 10 seconds after the ball has been placed at the disposal
of the free-thrower").
45. Compare FIBA Rules, supra n.22, art. 41.2.2 (forbidding players from touching
the ball only when it "is in contact with the ring" or "whilst [it] is within the basket"),
with NBA Rules, supra n.28, Rule 11 (b) (forbidding players from touching the ball
"when it is above the basket ring and within the imaginary cylinder").
46. As one commentator explained:
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ever, until U.S. players understand and master these rules or un-
til USA Basketball is able to induce the FIBA to change the rules
in its favor, U.S. teams will have to struggle in a game whose
rules go against their favor or intuition. Perhaps the proposals
to adopt international rules for the NBA are not as outrageous as
they sound.4 7
Like rules in a basketball game, intellectual property laws
differ across the world due to the diverging levels of wealth, eco-
nomic structures, technological capabilities, political systems,
and cultural traditions.4 8 Although the Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agree-
ment" or "the Agreement")4 9 successfully induces countries, in
particular less developed countries, to model their intellectual
property laws in the American image, 5° the United States also
If this tournament had been played under NBA rules, maybe the results would
have been different. That's not an alibi. That's reality. The international
game is a very different game from the NBA, and the Yanks have never fully
adapted to it over the last 15 years. (They still haven't grasped the concept of
legal goaltending and they have no clue how to read the officials.) And two
weeks isn't nearly enough prep time. There may never be enough time be-
cause it's a temporary thing anyway and the players know it.
May, supra n.15; Adande, supra n.9 (noting that the current U.S. team "wasn't enough
to beat teams that had ... more familiarity with the international rules"); Wilbon, supra
n.9 (considering arrogant and outdated the American notion that "the U.S. can send a
group of all-stars that has barely practiced together and is unfamiliar with the interna-
tional rules and style of play").
47. May, supra n.15 (proposing to adopt international rules in the NBA).
48. MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 191 (1998); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n.17,
at 239; Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra n.17, at 84; Peter K. Yu, Toward a
Nonzero-sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn
forom Mediators, Business Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. ON. L. REV.
569, 569 (2002) [hereinafter Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach].
49. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
50. Commentators discuss extensively the coercive nature of the TRIPS Agree-
ment. See, e.g., Ruth L. Gana (Okediji), Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some
Implications of the Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
109, 112 (1995) (examining the implications of the TRIPS Agreement "as a form of
passive coercion"); Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 614 (1996) [hereinafter Hamilton, TRIPS
Agreement] ("Far from being limited to trade relations, correcting the international bal-
ance of trade, or lowering customs trade barriers, TRIPS attempts to remake interna-
tional copyright law in the image of Western copyright law."); SurendraJ. Patel, Can the
Intellectual Property Rights System Serve the Interests of Indigenous Knowledge?, in VALUING
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has implemented changes that harmonize its intellectual prop-
erty laws with those of the international community. Among the
examples include copyright5  and patent term extension,5 2
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 305, 316
(Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds., 1996) (arguing that the TRIPS Agreement
"universalize[s] the U.S. system of intellectual property rights"); Yu, Toward a Nonzero-
sum Approach, supra n.48, at 636-37 (criticizing the TRIPS Agreement for its coercive
provisions). Some even consider the Agreement "imperialistic." See, e.g., Burrell, supra
n.18; Hamilton, TRIPS Agreement, supra, at 614 (contending that the TRIPS Agreement
could become "one of the most effective vehicles of Western imperialism in history");
id. at 617 (equating the TRIPS Agreement with "freedom imperialism"); A. Samuel
Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996);J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Op-
portunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 813 (1989)
(arguing that the "[i]mposition of foreign legal standards on unwilling states in the
name of 'harmonization' remains today what Ladas deemed it in 1975, namely, a polite
form of economic imperialism" (citing I STEVEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 14-15 (1975)); see also SA-
MUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD OR-
DER 184 (1996) [hereinafter HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS] (noting that
"[w] hat is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest"); Susan Strange, Cave! hic
dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 340 (Stephen D. Kras-
ner ed., 1983) (arguing that the American policy is a form of "nonterritorial imperial-
ism").
51. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. Sec. 304 (2000)) (extending the copy-
right term for twenty additional years); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (U.S. Jan.
15, 2003); Marci Hamilton, Bringing the People into the Copyright Arena: How the New
Awareness of Copyright Law Issues Can Help in Guarding the Public's Domain, FINDLAW'S
WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY (Mar. 29, 2001), at htpp://writ.news.findlaw.com/Hamil-
ton/20010329.html (discussing the difficulties of the Eldred litigation); Peter K. Yu, Free
the Mouse, IP WORLDWIDE, Oct. 2002, at 24 (discussing the potential implications of the
Eldred decision). For discussions of copyright term extension, see generally ROBERT L.
BARD & LEWIS KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION: DURATION, TERM EXTENTION, THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MAKING OF COPYRIGHT POLICY (1998); EXTENDING MICKEY'S
LIFE: ELDRED V. ASHCROFr AND THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION DEBATE (Peter K. Yu
ed., forthcoming 2003); Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: "Have
I Stayed Too Long?"52 FLA. L. REv. 989 (2000);Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for
the "Digital Millennium," 23 COLUM..VLAJ.L. & ARTS 137, 170-75 (1999); Marci A. Hamil-
ton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
LJ. 655 (1996); Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That - A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature)
Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 595 (1996); Dennis S. Karjala, The Term of Copyright, in GROWING PAINS:
ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR EDUCATION AND SOCIETY (Laura N. Gasaway ed., 1997); Law-
rence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skin, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 70-74
(2001); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Histori-
cal Perspective, 49 J. CoYR. Soc'Y U.S.A. 19 (2002); William F. Patty, The Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661 (1996); L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law
of Unintended Consequences, 8J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223 (2001);J.H. Reichman, The Duration
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adoption of the "intent to use" concept in trademark law,53 early
publication of patent applications, 4 and protection against cir-
cumvention of copy-protection technologies." Had there not
been serious constitutional problems, database protection might
become another area in which the United States harmonizes its
laws with those abroad."'
Today, harmonization is still at a very early stage. Although
of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625 (1995);
Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Tern Extension: How Long Is Too Long, 18
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651 (2000); Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property,
Congressional Power, and the Constitution, 36 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1 (2002); Edward C.
Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual Prop-
erty Clause, 7J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315 (2000).
52. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, Sec. 532(a) (1), 108 Stat.
4809, 4990 (1994) (extending patent term from seventeen to twenty years). For discus-
sions of patent term extension, see generally, Ochoa, supra n.51.
53. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667 Sec. 134, 102 Stat.
3935, 3947 (amending the trademark definition to allow for the use of "intent to use" as
a basis for applying for trademark registration); see also Michael H. Davis, Death of a
Salesman's Doctrine: A Critical Look at Trademark Use, 19 GA. L. REV. 233 (1985) (tracing
the evolution and decline of the trademark use doctrine in U.S. trademark law); Ken-
neth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in
the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (2000) (criticizing the recent efforts to harmo-
nize American trademark law with that of civil law nations for undermining the com-
mon law nature of the United States' trademark system and ignoring third parties'
equal but countervailing right to compete).
54. See Symposium, Early Patent Publication: A Boon or Bane? A Discussion on the Legal
and Economic Effects of Publishing Patent Applications After Eighteen Months of Filing, 16 CAR-
Dozo ARTS & ENT LJ. 601 (1998); see alsoJohn F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global
Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002) (discussing the costs and benefits of
international harmonization of patent laws).
55. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-204, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
56. For discussions of the European Union ("EU") Database Directive and recent
development concerning U.S. database legislation, see, for example, Yochai Benkler,
Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and
Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States
and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997); Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor
Benkler, 15 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 605 (2000); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting
Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and
the First Amendment, 17 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 (1999); J.H. Reichman & Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 97 (1997); J.H.
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and
Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (1999); Peter K. Yu,
Evolving Legal Protection for Databases, GICALAw.COM, at http://www.gigalaw.com/arti
cles/2000/yu-2000-12.html (Dec. 2000). See also Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property
and International Mergers and Acquisitions, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1294-95 (1998) (dis-
cussing the tension between the EU Database Directive and the TRIPS Agreement).
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it is certain that harmonization will continue, it is difficult to pre-
dict how the process will play out, for harmonization is not
easy.57 Although developed countries "claim[ ... ] that stronger
intellectual property protection will benefit developing coun-
tries, this relationship has yet to be demonstrated in either eco-
nomic theory or empirical proof."5 Equally questionable is the
presumption that a universalized regime would maximize global
welfare 59 and that the current level of intellectual property pro-
57. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n.17, at 239 (noting that harmonization is
not an easy process); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of Interna-
tional Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 737 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Dinwoodie, Development and Incorporation of International Norms] ("As more recent
efforts at intellectual property harmonization in the European Union (the EU) have
demonstrated, achieving comprehensive unification of laws is extremely difficult in ar-
eas where divergent national jurisprudence has already taken root."). See also id. at 737
n.16 (noting that "[i]nternational agreement is easier to forge in areas of new social
(and hence legislative) activity, such as the allocation of domain names, that arise first
in an inherently non-national setting"). See generally PHILIP LEITH, HARMONISATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE: A CASE STUDY OF PATENT PROCEDURE (1998) (dis-
cussing efforts to harmonize patent protection throughout the EU). Indeed, as Profes-
sor Dinwoodie pointed out, due to the various differences among countries, conflicts
will continue to exist despite the recent harmonization attempts. As he explained:
The standards found in international agreements typically are minimum stan-
dards; states are free to grant higher levels of protection. Thus, notwithstand-
ing international minimum standards, differences in national laws persist.
Moreover, in certain crucial areas, the treaties allow member states significant
latitude to adopt rules that are tailored to their own social and economic pri-
orities and philosophies. For example, states signatory to international copy-
right conventions may generally define the central concept of "author" in dif-
ferent ways that reflect quite divergent philosophical groundings of copyright
(and which thus identify different authors of a work). This conscious, and
valuable, concession to national autonomy and the value of diversity creates
potential conflicts issues.
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle for Resurgent
Comparativist Thought, 49 AM.J. COMP. L. 429, 436 (2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Inter-
national Intellectual Property Litigation].
58. SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 221 (1998); see also Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus
Differentiation in Intellectual Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 89, 90 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al.
eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLEc-rUAL PROPERTY RIt-ITS]
("There is little in economic theory to support convergence of [intellectual property
rights] systems on a cross-country basis, particularly if convergence means an increase
in the level of protection in developing and industrializing countries."). But see Richard
T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Develop-
ing Countries, 24J. WORLD TRADE 75 (1990) (asserting that the level of economic devel-
opment is closely correlated to the existing level of intellectual property protection).
59. See Carlos M. Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in Latin America:
Is There Still Room for Differentiation?, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 109, 126 (1997);
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tection has struck "the right balance between incentives to fu-
ture production, the free flow of information and the preserva-
tion of the public domain in the interest of potential future cre-
ators.""' Indeed, many Americans disagree on the proper
balance between intellectual property and public access to infor-
mation.6 1 Some also are dissatisfied with the current intellectual
property regime, which, they argue, protects the copyright in-
dustries at the expense of the general public.6 2
So far, many less developed countries are reluctant to West-
ernize (or Northernize) their intellectual property regimes, be-
cause a Western regime might contradict their existing eco-
Frischtak, supra n.58, at 103-05 (urging countries to develop their intellectual property
rights regime according to their own needs); see also Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for
International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 152 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)
(arguing that an international regime may not yield overall welfare benefits and that
actors outside the regime may suffer).
60. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
INFORMATION SOCIETY 124 (1996); seeJ.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers:
Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 24 (1997)
[hereinafter Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers] (arguing that policymakers in
many developed countries take the existing levels of innovative strength for granted
and mistakenly promote protectionism); see also F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE
ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988) ("While property is initially a product
of custom, and jurisdiction and legislation have merely developed it in the course of
millennia, there is then no reason to suppose that the particular forms it has assumed
in the contemporary world are final.").
61. William P. Alford, How Theory Does - and Does Not - Matter: American Ap-
proaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 22 (1994)
[hereinafter Alford, How Theory Does - and Does Not - Matter]; see also Dennis S.
Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software and the New Protectionism, 28JURIMETRICSJ. 33 (1987)
(arguing that policymakers and the judiciary should not automatically apply the ex-
isting copyright paradigm to computer software); John Perry Barlow, The Economy of
Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents & Copyrights in the Digital Age (Everything You
Know About Intellectual Property Is Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84 (arguing against the
need for copyright in digital media).
62. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN
A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (lamenting how the media and software industries are
stifling innovation in the New Economy); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001)
(showing how increased domination of interest groups in lawmaking processes has
made copyright law anti-public and incomprehensible); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPY-
RIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS
CREATIVITY (2001) (describing how increasing corporate control over the use of
software, digital music, images, films, books and academic materials has steered copy-
right law away from its original design to promote creativity and cultural vibrancy);
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) (advocating the use of Justice Brandeis'
conception that information should be "free as the air to common use" as a conceptual
baseline to limit property rights in information products).
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nomic policies.6" Involving a fundamental debate about eco-
nomic development strategy,64 a new intellectual property
regime also might threaten the established relationships of busi-
nesses and the government65 and put the ruling elites in a preca-
rious position.66
Moreover, as many commentators pointed out, the Western
intellectual property regime does not necessarily embody univer-
sal values.6 7 Rather, the Western system becomes universal be-
cause it is backed by great economic and military might.66 From
63. Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n. 17, at 237.
64. See LESTER C. THUROW, BUILDING WEALTH: THE NEW RULES FOR THE INDIVIDU-
ALS, COMPANIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 128 (1999) (arguing
that countries with different levels of economic development desire, need, and should
have, different intellectual property systems); Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers,
supra n.60, at 25 ("[A]dherence to the TRIPS Agreement requires [less developed]
countries to reconcile their own economic development goals with their international
intellectual property norms."); see alsoJanet H. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Signifi-
cance of Piracy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CON-
FLICT? 89 (R. Michael Gadbaw & TimothyJ. Richards eds., 1988) [hereinafter GLOBAL
CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?] (examining whether intellectual property protection is
of net benefit to less developed countries); A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent
System and Third World Development. Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831 (arguing that
the Paris Convention incurs significant costs to less developed countries); J.H.
Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual Property
Rights, and International Trade After the GAIT's Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75,
81 (1993) ("[P]olicymakers concerned to promote investment in important new tech-
nologies often overstate the supposed benefits of specific intellectual property regimes
while ignoring the negative economic functions of these regimes in relation to the com-
plementary operations of competition law generally.").
65. See RYAN, supra n.48.
66. See SELL, supra n. 58, at 215 (noting that "if they succumb to U.S. pressure, they
are subject to criticisms of selling out sovereignty to foreign interests"); Burrell, supra
n.18, at 207 ("Clearly no Chinese leader could be seen bowing to pressure from the
United States without being in danger of undermining his own position, a difficulty
which goes some way towards explaining much of the brinkmanship which has
characterised the negotiations between China and the United States on the issue."); see
also HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 33 (1997) ("The structure of domestic preferences
holds a key to understanding international cooperation."); id. at 246-47 (arguing that
international cooperation is the continuation of domestic politics by other means);
Ronald Rogowski, Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 115 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 1999) (arguing
that the domestic political institutions affect the formation of foreign policy and the
strategies actors choose); Renato Ruggiero, Whither the Trade System Next?, in THE URU-
GUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR DUNKEL 123, 139 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds., 1998) (arguing that the post-Cold War international
system "is blurring the distinction between foreign and domestic policies").
67. Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n.17, at 235.
68. Alford, How Theory Does -- and Does Not - Matter, supra n.61, at 17; see also
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the standpoint of less developed countries, the Western system is
flawed for its failure to recognize the value of raw materials used
in the creation of intellectual property.69 By doing so, the West-
ern system also "disproportionately ... favor[s] the developed
countries' contributions to world science and culture"7 ' and ig-
nores the interests of less developed countries which supply the
raw materials. Small wonders less developed countries are push-
ing for a more balanced regime that offers stronger protection
to folklore, traditional knowledge, and indigenous creations and
inventions.7 '
LESSON 2: THE OFFICIALS
International "officials," whether judges or referees, behave
differently. We often take for granted our interpretation of
rules, ignoring others' tradition and cultural background, until a
foreign judge applies a wholly different interpretation. Our
shocks are no different from what the U.S. basketball players ex-
perienced when they were confused by the international referees
and the style of international play.7 2 What they had expected to
ENDESIIAW, supra n.18, at 93 ("[W]hether or not [intellectual property] was consciously
designed to serve economic policies in any of the [industrialized countries], it has al-
ways evolved in response to economic and political necessity."); RosemaryJ. Coombe,
THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APiPROPRIATION, AND
THE LAw 247 (1998) ("The range of Western beliefs that define intellectual and cultural
property laws ... are not universal values that express the full range of human possibil-
ity, but particular, interested fictions emergent from a history of colonialism that has
disempowered many of the world's peoples."). Indeed, as Professor Samuel Hunting-
ton explained, Western culture and ideology are sometimes attractive because they are
backed by hard economic and military power:
[Culture and ideology] become attractive when they are seen as rooted in ma-
terial success and influence. . . . Increases in hard economic and military
power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superi-
ority of one's own culture or soft power compared to those of other peoples
and greatly increase its attractiveness to other peoples. Decreases in economic
and military power lead to self-doubt, crises of identity, and efforts to find in
other cultures the keys to economic, military, and political success.
HUNTINGTON, CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS, supra n.50, at 92.
69. BOYLE, supra n.60, at 126.
70. Bellagio Declaration (1993), in BOYLE, supra n.60, at 195. The Bellagio Decara-
tion was drafted at the 1993 Bellagio Conference on "Cultural Agency/Cultural Author-
ity: Politics and Poetics of Intellectual Property in the Post-Colonial Era."
71. See generally Symposium, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indige-
nous Culture, II CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2003).
72. See Oscar Dixon, Determined U.S. Women Set Gold Standard, USA TODAY, Sept. 12,
2002, at 6C ("I'M sure a lot of guys who played in the world championships for the first
time were probably in shock because of the physicality of the game, the style, the rules,
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be a call had become a non-call, and what they had expected to
be legal had become a foul.
True, basketball is just a game, and we, the audience, could
criticize the referees as much as we want, just like how some
commentators did during and after the games. However, if
Team USA were to return to its former glory, its players must not
only understand the different rules, but also the different inter-
pretations. David Stern, the NBA Commissioner, was quick to
recognize this need. After the defeat, he suggested that U.S.
players would benefit from a much longer training period with
more exhibition games with FIBA referees.7" Perhaps, the re-
sults of the tournament could have been much different had
USA Basketball paid more attention in this area earlier.
Like referees, foreign judges, in particular those who have
been trained in civil law countries, tend to interpret laws differ-
ently,"4 especially in areas where fundamental philosophical dif-
the zone and the sagging man-to-man defense." (quoting remarks of Lisa Leslie, WNBA
player and member of U.S. Women's Basketball Team)); Dick Weiss, U.S. Misses World
Piece, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2002, at 75 (noting that "the Americans struggle to adjust to
the international style" and that the U.S. team "was baffled by the simple 2-3 zones
international teams play").
73. Feigen, World Championships Fiasco, supra n.15 (quoting David Stern, the NBA
Commissioner).
74. See generally George C. Christie, Some Key Jurisprudential Issues of the Twenty-First
Century, 8 TeL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217, 218-23 (2000) (discussing the different ap-
proaches to judicial interpretation by common law and civil law judges). See also id. at
217 (noting that "the decisions in concrete legal cases will be influenced as much by
what we believe to be the proper method for deciding legal disputes as by the views that
we entertain on the merits of the controversies before us"); id. at 221-22 (noting that
"when difficult questions of interpretation of international instruments arise, how they
will be resolved will often be affected as much by the style of legal reasoning as by the
deciding court's views on the substantive issues involved"); Dinwoodie, International In-
tellectual Property Litigation, supra n.57, at 436 (noting that "even identical rules of law
may lead to different results when applied in different social contexts by different tribu-
nals").
Professor Christie attributed the differences between the American and the Euro-
pean model of statutory interpretation to the U.S. system of government. As he ex-
plained:
The United States does not have a parliamentary system of government. The
executive cannot control the legislative process. More often than not, in re-
cent times, the same political party has not controlled the executive and the
two co-equal branches of the American legislature. Even when the Presidency,
the House of Representatives, and the Senate have been controlled by the
same party, the lack of strong centralized parties, along the European model,
has meant that the executive branch has not been able to control the legisla-
tive process to the same extent that its European counterparts normally can.
Although there is a legislative drafting service available to help representatives
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ferences are involved. Unless the litigants (and their lawyers)
were able to grasp these different philosophies, they would un-
likely be able to reconcile the differences before a tribunal75 or
to convince the judge that a particular philosophy would be
more influential in light of the circumstances at issue. Even
when identical laws are involved, different outcomes might re-
sult,76 for laws are normally applied by reference to national
market conditions, social contexts, and local practices.77 After
all, factual differences in social practices, competitive conditions,
or consumer attitudes usually lead to different legal conclusions
that rest on factual findings.78
and senators draft legislation, much legislation is not subjected to that profes-
sional screening. Indeed, many important elements of legislation are inserted
as amendments in an ad hoc manner. In operation, the whole American sys-
tem functions as a device for forcing compromises at every step in the legisla-
tive process, with the result that there are many compromises. What the
United States Supreme Court may be doing is respecting the compromise-
seeking nature of the legislative process. The almost obsessive search of U.S.
courts for congressional intent, as revealed in the committee reports and de-
bates of Congress, clearly reflects an appreciation of the fact that legislation is
the product of compromise, and that the courts exist to make those com-
promises effective. In so doing, the courts, with good reason, presuppose that
the American public accepts the fact that government in a democracy is gov-
ernment by compromise, and that this public applauds the courts' attempts to
facilitate the compromises reached in the legislative forum. In short, the ideal
legislature as conceived in American political theory is one committed to com-
promise, and not one always seeking to give voice to the highest standards of
rationality and to further the most noble aspirations of the society for which it
legislates.
Christie, supra, at 222-23.
75. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation, supra n.57, at 443 (noting
that "[r]econciling instrumentalist economic philosophies with personality-based no-
tions of rights, for example, requires a real grasp of these different philosophies" (cit-
ing Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976))).
76. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation, supra n.57, at 436 (noting
that "even identical rules of law may lead to different results when applied in different
social contexts by different tribunals").
77. Id. (noting that "[n]ational laws - including harmonized national laws - are
normally applied by reference to national market conditions").
78. Id. at 436. As Professor Dinwoodie elaborated:
For example, the meaning of a word or other symbol claimed as a trademark
may vary from one country to another because of both linguistic denotation
and social connotation, and thus the application of the same trademark rule
may generate a different result because the word or symbol operates as a
trademark in only some of those countries. Numerous intellectual property
concepts reflect underlying determinations of the appropriate balance be-
tween ensuring competition and stimulating innovation; but different compet-
itive climates may subsist in different national markets, warranting a different
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Moreover, judges in different jurisdictions classify claims
and disputes differently. For example, a U.S. court would clas-
sify the scope of a grant of copyright law as a contract law ques-
tion, whereas a German court would classify the issue as a matter
of substantive copyright law.7 9 Likewise, for a work that was pub-
balance and thus divergent interpretation of the (supposedly harmonized)
concept in question. Whether an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is
fair use may in part depend upon whether a market for such uses is "tradi-
tional, reasonable, or likely to develop," which in turn may hinge on nationally
distinct social practices and technological capabilities. Consumers in different
national markets, subjected to different marketing practices, may be confused
by the use of an allegedly similar trademark in different circumstances.
Id. at 436-37. Professor George Fletcher provided an insightful analysis of how foreign
judges' conception of fairness differs from that of American judges:
A slightly different mode of linguistic influence comes to light in the way
Americans and other English-speaking peoples talk about fairness. We have
coined the phrases "fair play" and "fair trial" and have bequeathed them to the
Western world - both in law and in daily speech. Many of our neighboring
cultures simply adopt the word "fair" into their vocabularies as an untranslat-
able American idea. Thus you can hear Germans and Israelis using the Ameri-
can word "fair" as though it were their own. Others like the French try in vain
to translate the notion of fairness as "equitable" or 'lust" but these and other
cognates in other Romance languages overlook the procedural bedrock of fair
dealing.
Americans learn the notion of fair play as soon as they begin playing with
other children. Enter any kindergarten and watch children playing with a sin-
gle ball or Lego set. Sooner or later one of them will complain that another is
not sharing, that he or she is "not fair." The charge of unfairness is a tool that
children quickly learn to protect their interests. Not sharing is paradigmatic
unfairness. So is not playing by the rules.
The best explanation for this faith in fairness lies in our cultural roots. To
appreciate the uniqueness of English-language culture, we need only pause to
reflect upon the sporting metaphors that abound in everyday speech. A fair
competition is one in which the playing field is level, the dice are not loaded,
the deck not stacked. Fairness consists of playing by even-handed rules.
Neither side hits below the belt. No one hides the ball. You don't sandbag the
opposition by passing on the first round and then raising your opponent's bet.
In a fair competition, both sides retain an equal chance of winning. And the
winning side should gain the upper hand without cheating, without playing
dirty, without hitting the other when he or she is down. These idioms pervade
the English language. No other European language relies so heavily on sport-
ing metaphors to carry on the business of the day. This is a striking feature of
English and American culture. We cannot think about human relations with-
out thinking about sports and the idiom of fair play and foul play. This is not
true in French, German, Russian, Italian, or any other major language or cul-
ture of the West. This correlation provides powerful evidence of the strong
link between culture and language.
George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683,
699-700 (1998).
79. See Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a "Bundle" of National Copy-
236 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:218
lished in the 1950s, a Brazilian court would find the contract
determinative of the duration of a grant effected by a Brazilian
author under Brazilian law, while a U.S. court would apply the
United States Code to determine whether the same author prop-
erly executed its grant of the second term."0
In general, companies are able to secure more preferable
forums through contractual arrangements81 or by mounting
choice-of-law arguments.8 2 However, governments do not have
right Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47J. COPYRIGHT Soc'V U.S.A. 265, 280 (2000) [here-
inafter Ginsburg, International Copyright].
80. See id.
81. See id. at 280-82. As Professor Ginsburg described:
Choice of law and of forum clauses offer a primary means of sidestepping the
potentially applicable norms of other countries (subject to exceptions such as
ordre public). Choice of law clauses can be especially relevant to resolution of
disputes concerning copyright ownership when the work involves the partici-
pation of multiple authors from many different countries. Similarly, choice of
law clauses may simplify issues concerning the scope of a grant of multiter-
ritorial rights under copyright.
Choice of forum clauses are also important. The choice of the forum
does not, by itself, determine the applicable law. But, because each forum
applies its own conflict rules to characterize the nature of the claim and to
designate the choice of law rule that applies to that kind of claim, forum selec-
tion can favor some laws over others. For example, some fora may consider
some features of the national copyright law, such as moral rights, to be
mandatory even in international situations; choosing a forum that does not
impose its own laws as laws of immediate application (or "lois de police") can
amount to avoiding a specific set of mandatory national rules regarding copy-
right.
Id. at 280-81.
82. For discussions of choice-of-law issues in intellectual property litigation, see gen-
erally EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1978);
Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copy-
right Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VIA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1999); Graeme W. Austin,
Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 79 OR. L.
REV. 575 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Global-
ism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1997); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why
National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000); Dinwoodie,
International Intellectual Property Litigation, supra n.57; Paul Edward Geller, From Patchwork
to Network: Strategies for International Intellectual Property in Flux, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 69 (1998) [hereinafter Geller, From Patchwork to Network]; Paul Edward Geller, Master-
ing Conflicts of Laws in International Intellectual Property Litigation, IPL NEWSL. ("ABA"),
Summer 2000, at 7; Paul Edward Geller, International Intellectual Property, Conflicts of
Laws, and Internet Remedies, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 125 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in
Cyberspace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153 (1997);Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality
and Multiterritoriality in Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (1997); David R.
Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1367 (1996); William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 Am. J. CoMP. L.
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this luxury where intellectual property matters are concerned.
The TRIPS Agreement requires all governments to resolve intel-
lectual property conflicts through the dispute resolution process
of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 8" As a result, the
United States will have to argue before panelists who have differ-
ent training and backgrounds84 and might be subject to adverse
rulings that are in tension with the U.S. constitutional principles
and legal tradition.85
Indeed, foreign countries increasingly rely on the dispute
settlement mechanism of the WTO to resolve conflicts they have
with the United States. For example, most recently, the Euro-
pean Union challenged the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of
1998 ("FIMLA")86 before the Dispute Settlement Panel of the
WTO.87 FIMLA codifies the compromise between copyright
383 (2000); Peter K. Yu, Conflict of Laws Issues in International Copyright Cases,
GIGALAW.COM (Apr. 2001), at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/yu-2001-04.html.
See also Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. LJ. 883 (2002)
(developing a new foundation for choice-of-law scholarship in light of globalization and
technological change); Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90 GEO.
LJ. 957 (2002) (responding to Professor Andrew Guzman); Erin Ann O'Hara, Econom-
ics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws, 90 GEO. L.J. 941 (2002) (replying to
Professor Guzman).
83. Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that all intellectual property con-
flicts arising under the Agreement be settled by the dispute settlement procedure pro-
vided in the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs. TRIPS Agreement, supra n.49,
art. 64, 33 I.L.M. at 1221. See generally DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIs, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1999), for
a comprehensive discussion of the dispute settlement procedure of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO").
84. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 8, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) (providing the procedure for establish-
ing a Panel and selecting panelists). See generally PALMETER & MAvROIDIS, supra n.83, at
68-70 (discussing the composition of a WITO Dispute Settlement Panel).
85. Concerned about these adverse rulings, the Senate Majority leader proposed, a
few days before Congress voted on the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, to establish a
statutory commission to review adopted WTO Panel reports adverse to the United
States. As proposed, the Commission will review the Panel reports based on four crite-
ria: (1) whether the Panel had exceeded its authority or terms of reference; (2)
whether it added to the obligations, or diminished the rights, of the United States; (3)
whether it acted arbitrarily or capriciously or engaged in misconduct, and (4) whether
it deviated from the applicable standard of review. This proposal was subsequently
abandoned. SeeJohn H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Accept-
ance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157,
186-87 (1997) (discussing the proposed INTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission).
86. Pub. L. 105-298, Sec. 202, 112 Stat. 2830-31 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. Secs.
101, 110(5) (B), 504, 513 (2000)).
87. For excellent discussions of the dispute, see generally Dinwoodie, Development
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holders and small business enterprises" by amending section
110(5) of the United States Copyright Act by exempting from
royalties those restaurants, bars, and retail stores that use
"homestyle" audio and video equipment to play broadcast mu-
sic.8 9 The European Union argued that the FIMLA and the
homestyle exemption of the United States Copyright Act9" vio-
lated the United States' obligations under the TRIPS Agree-
ment. The United States defended that the exemption is valid
under article 13 of the Agreement.9"
The Dispute Settlement Panel held for the European
Union, maintaining that the FIMLA violated articles 11 bis(1) (iii)
and 11(1) (ii) of the Berne Convention as incorporated into the
TRIPS Agreement.92 To remedy this violation, the Panel recom-
mended that "the Dispute Settlement Body request the United
States to bring [the FIMLA] into conformity with its obligations
under the TRIPS Agreement."9 3 Although the United States
eventually entered into an agreement with the European Union
to submit to binding arbitration,94 this case provides an excellent
and Incorporation of International Norms, supra n.57; Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on a
U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80
B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000).
88. Helfer, supra n.87, at 102 (noting that the FIMLA "split the difference between
business interests who wanted a total exemption for secondary uses of broadcast music
and [performing rights organizations] and copyright owners who opposed any relaxa-
tion of the homestyle exemption").
89. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 110(5) (B).
90. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 110(5)(A).
91. Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: "Members shall confine limita-
tions or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with
a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder." TRIPS Agreement, supra n.49, art. 13.
92. World Trade Organization, United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright
Act: Report of the Pane WT/DS/160/R, para. 7.1 (b) (June 15, 2000), available at http://
www.wto.org:
Subparagraph (B) of Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act does not meet
the requirements of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and is thus inconsis-
tent with Articles llbis(1)(iii) and lI(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention (1971)
as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by Article 9.1 of that Agreement.
Id.
93. Id. para. 7.2.
94. See Phil Hardy, WTO Arbitrators Rule That U.S. Should Pay $1.4m a Year to EU
Copyright Owners, MusIC & COPYRIGHT, Nov. 7, 2001 (providing background for the
WTO arbitration decision). In November 2001, the Arbitration Panel awarded EU cop-
yright holders about $1.4 million per year for lost revenues caused by the FIMLA.
World Trade Organization, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Recourse
to Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU, WT/DS160/ARB25/1, para. 5.1 (Nov. 9, 2001),
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illustration on how the United States would increasingly find it-
self defending its policies in a forum that has judges with differ-
ent cultures, philosophies, and legal traditions.9"
Going hand in hand with judges is the legal system, which
diverges from one country to another.96 Adjustment to these sys-
tems is sometimes difficult, especially in countries that lack a so-
phisticated legal system or that have limited respect for the rule
of law. For example, in China,97 courts until recently were of
limited effectiveness9" and were marred by various structural
problems, such as "the limited independence of the judicial
branch, the intertwining relationship between the court and the
available at http://www.wto.org (determining the award at 1,219,900 Euros per year); see
also Hardy, supra (discussing the arbitration decision). Despite the arbitration ruling,
questions remain as to how the U.S. government will fund the settlement and distribute
the penalty money. See id. For discussion of events occurring after the arbitration deci-
sion, see International Development, ENT. L. REP., Mar. 2002; Settlement Between European
Union and United States of W'O Fairness in Music Licensing Case Appears to Have Fallen
Apart, ENT. L. REP., Feb. 2002.
95. For a brief overview of WTO dispute settlement matters involving the United
States, see Office of the United States Trade Representatives, Dispute Settlement Update
(July 16, 2002), available at http://www.ustr.gov.
96. See Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation, supra n.57, at 441-42
(noting that "[ulnderstanding foreign substantive law often requires a more genera-
lized appreciation of foreign systems and methods that does not neatly correlate to the
specialized division of substantive law").
97. For discussions of the development of the rule of law in China, see, for exam-
ple, RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURT AND LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 101-07 (1997); CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS (Stanley Lubman ed.,
1996); DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994); RON-
ALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW (1994); THE LIMITS OF THE RULE
OF LAW IN CHINA (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000); MURRAY SCOTT TANNER, THE POLIT-
ICS OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC PROS-
PECTS (1999); Stanley B. Lubman, Studying Contemporary Chinese Law: Limits, Possibilities,
and Strategy, 39 AM.J. COMP. L. 293 (1991).
98. See Jeffrey w. Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to
Protection and the Need for the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 24-25 (1996) (not-
ing that "[t]he court system as an institution generally lacks the political muscle to stare
down powerful, local officials who may wish to impede law enforcement"); Thomas
Lagerqvist & Mary L. Riley, How to Protect Intellectual Property Rights in China, in PROTECT-
ING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 7, 28 (Mary L. Riley ed., 1997) (explaining
that "[i] n China, administrative enforcement is occasionally seen as more cost effective
than either civil or criminal proceedings against counterfeiters"). But see id. at 32 (argu-
ing that "[dlue to the more public nature of a court action, there is somewhat less
likelihood that a judge will give in to local pressure"); Yiqiang Li, Evaluation of the Sino-
American Intellectual Property Agreements: A Judicial Approach to Solving the Local Protection-
ism Problem, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391, 414-15 (1996) (noting that courts are more
powerful than administrative agencies and may institute preliminary measures against
the infringer no matter where it is located).
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Chinese Communist Party, the court's vulnerability to outside in-
fluence, the judges' susceptibility to bribery and corruption, un-
derfunding, abuse of government officials, and local protection-
ism."" The acute shortage of lawyers,""' in particular intellec-
tual property lawyers, in China, also makes it difficult for
businesses and individuals to obtain competent legal advice and
services to protect and enforce intellectual property rights.
In addition, because personal connections, or guanxi, are
essential to commercial success in China, litigation would be
considered unappealing by most foreign firms that intend to
continue doing business in the country, for lawsuits might wreck
the guanxi needed for future business dealings.""1 The different
legal strategies available under the Chinese legal system also
pose challenges to foreigners. A case in point is the dual option
of administrative and judicial enforcement, which is particularly
confusing to foreign businesses that are accustomed to only judi-
cial enforcement. 10 2
99. Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n.17, at 217-18.
100. ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODuC-rION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 37 (1998); William P. Alford, Tasselled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers:
Transformation and Tension in the World of Chinese Legal Workers, in CHINA'S LEGAL RE-
FORMS, supra n.97, at 22, 30; Berkman, supra n.98, at 29; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra
n.17; Jianyang Yu, Protection of Intellectual Property in the P.R. C.: Progress, Problems, and
Proposals, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 140, 149 (1994); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives,
supra n.17, at 71. This shortage may alleviate once China lifts the geographic ban on
overseas lawyers and opens up the legal profession to foreign law firms, as it joins the
INTO. "So far, branches of overseas law firms have been set up in only eight cities
including Beijing and Shanghai among all the fifteen Chinese cities which have govern-
ment permission to hold overseas law firms." China: Geographic Restrictions on Lawyers to
Be Lifted After W17O, CHINA Bus. INFO. NETWORK, May 4, 1999.
101. Gregory S. Kolton, Comment, Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China: A Review and Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 415, 451 (1996) (arguing that "it may be difficult for foreign firms
which plan to continue doing business in China to sue because doing so may wreck
their 'guanxi'- personal contacts or favors - that are integral for doing business in
[China]").
102. One commentator compared administrative and judicial enforcements:
The courts are . . . more powerful than administrative agencies. While an
administrative agency may only take action against infringers located in the
same area, a court, under proper procedure, may institute preliminary mea-
sures against the infringer no matter where it is located. In the past, a court
could only detain a suspect with the consent of the suspect's local court. The
Supreme People's Court has recently waived this requirement, apparently out
of a concern for the undue influence of local protectionism. In a breach of
contract case, Yanbian Leather Factory vs. Mishan City Shoe Factory, the de-
fendant's place of business was in Mishan City, Heilongjiang Province whereas
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In sum, unless businesses successfully adapt to the foreign
legal environment, legal actions sometimes may result in unex-
pected outcomes that shock the litigants and affect adversely
their interests. As courts increasingly engage in choice-of-law
analyses and apply foreign laws in domestic fora, a deeper un-
derstanding of foreign legal systems and laws might become nec-
essary. 103
LESSON 3: THE COMPETITION
So far, the United States has been very successful in export-
ing its ideas and concepts. From laws'. 4 to basketball,' ° coun-
the breach took place in Longjing City, Jilin Province. The City Court of
Longjing City rendered a defaultjudgment against the defendant and ordered
bailiffs to seize the defendant's properties in Mishan City. With the support of
the local enforcement authority, the defendant regained the confiscated
properties. The City Court of Longjing held that the defendant had seriously
obstructed justice and, citing Articles 102(1) (2) and 105 of the Civil Proce-
dure Law, detained the manager and assistant manager of the defendant's
company, who were in Mishan City at the time. The defendant ultimately
complied with the court's order and surrendered the confiscated properties.
Here, the City Court of Longjing had not sought the approval of the City
Court of Mishan and the decision was upheld by the Supreme People's Court.
Li, supra n.98, at 414-15; see also Susan Finder, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Through the Courts, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 255 (Mark A.
Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (discussing issues potential litigants in the Chinese courts must
be aware of when considering whether to seek enforcement of intellectual property
rights through Chinese courts). But see Berkman, supra n.98, at 24 (arguing that "[t]he
court system as an institution generally lacks the political muscle to stare down power-
ful, local officials who may wish to impede law enforcement"); Lagerqvist & Riley, supra
n.98, at 28 ("In China, administrative enforcement is occasionally seen as more cost
effective than either civil or criminal proceedings against counterfeiters."); Kolton,
supra n.101, at 451 (suggesting that "it may be difficult for foreign firms which plan to
continue doing business in China to sue because doing so may wreck their 'guanxi' -
personal contacts or favors - that are integral for doing business in the PRC").
103. See Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation, supra n.57, at 441
(noting that "the mere fact that national courts are now engaging in serious copyright
choice of law analysis and that they are contemplating the application of foreign law
requires us to know foreign law more intimately and thus enhances the need for com-
parative work"); id. at 453 (noting that "the increasingly multidimensional nature of
international intellectual property litigation may mean that only a comparativist can
fully appreciate these dimensions and accord them the proper weight"); see also
Dinwoodie, Development and Incorporation of International Norms, supra n.57, at 777 (not-
ing that "[c]ultural assimilation and the ability of digitized works to evade national reg-
ulation make it significantly more likely that modern copyright litigation will entail
analysis of different national laws").
104. For discussions of legal transplants, see generally ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE
STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (1978); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN AP-
PROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993); Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in
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International Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994);
Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 27
(1974); Herbert H.P. Ma, The Chinese Concept of the Individual and the Reception of Foreign
Law, 9J. CHINESE L. 207 (1995); Julie Mertus, Mapping Civil Society Transplants: A Prelim-
inavy Comparison of Eastern Europe and Latin America, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 921 (1999). See
alsoJAMEs A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAwYERs & FOREIGN AID IN LATIN
AMERICA 280 (1980) (arguing that the law and development movement was "an ener-
getic but flawed attempt to provide American legal assistance and to transfer American
legal models, which were themselves flawed"); Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United
States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World
and Beyond, 20 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 179 (1999) (discussing American legal assistance
to post-Communist societies); John V. Orth, Exporting the Rule of Law, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 71, 82 (1998) ("Legal culture is not so readily exportable as scientific
culture, in which the medium is the universal language of mathematics and experi-
ments are reproducible abroad. Law is inevitably more local."); Ann Seidman & Robert
B. Seidman, Drafting Legislation for Development: Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1 (1996) (discussing the difficulties encountered while assisting China in
drafting legislation). As Professor Huntington cautioned LIS in his seminal work, POLIT-
ICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES:
In confronting the modernizing countries the United States was handicapped
by its happy history. In its development the United States was blessed with
more than its fair share of economic plenty, social well-being, and political
stability. This pleasant conjuncture of blessings led Americans to believe in
the unity of goodness: to assume that all good things go together and that the
achievement of one desirable social goal aids in the achievement of others. In
American policy toward modernizing countries the experience was reflected
in the belief that political stability would be the natural and inevitable result of
the achievement of first, economic development and then of social reform....
... In some instances programs of economic development may promote
political stability; in other instances they may seriously undermine such stabil-
ity.., the relationship between social reform and political stability resembled
that between economic development and political stability. In some circum-
stances reforms may reduce tensions and encourage peaceful rather than vio-
lent change. In other circumstances, however, reform may well exacerbate
tensions, precipitate violence, and be a catalyst of rather than a substitute for
revolution.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POI.rrICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 5-7 (1968).
105. See LAFEBER, sup-a n.19, at 14 (noting that "basketball has become an impor-
tant fixture in global as well as American culture"); Dan Markowitz, Foreign Youths Learn
Basketball, U.S. Style, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, Sec. 14WC, at 9 (considering basketball
the United States' leading sport export); Barry Stavro, America from Abroad, L.A. TIMES,
July 10, 1990, at H6 (noting that basketball is a "favorite American export"); Tony Van
Alphen, NBA Czar Forecasts Big Exports for Sports, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 22, 1992, at F3
(quoting remarks of David Stern, the NBA Commissioner, that "North American sports,
properly done, can become a very interesting global export"); Thomas P. Wyman, Bas-
ketball - Made in America, Loved Throughout the World, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, at 6D (point-
ing out that "[t]he United States at last has managed to export a sport that captures the
imagination, and support, of much of the world"). See also LAFEBER, supra n.19 (using
Michael Jordan as an example of how U.S. corporations have used technology to sell
their products in the global marketplace).
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tries have incorporated American concepts into their systems. 1°6
Indeed, as Professor Robert Keohane and Dean Joseph Nye
pointed out, the United States possesses immense "soft
power."' 7 By appealing to its ideas and culture, rather than by
military means, the country successfully transforms others' pref-
erences by convincing them that the American way is more pref-
erable.
It is no coincidence that teenagers abroad are wearing Air
Jordans or Reebok Pumps or that they are imitating NBA play-
ers, longing to be the next Magic, Michael, or Larry (or perhaps
even Sir Charles).' With aggressive marketing and the ubiquity
of American media, basketball has become the leading Ameri-
can sport export, and the NBA a global brand.0 9 Indeed, many
countries have begun to give up their traditional pastimes for
basketball. A case in point is the former British West Indies, in
which basketball "began to displace cricket as the national
sport."11 0
Unfortunately, the United States' success in exporting its
ideas and concepts puts the country in a "catch-22" position. Af-
106. Ironically, in making their transition from a command economy to market
economy, some emerging democracies have emulated U.S. policy without understand-
ing the dire ramifications of their action:
For example, the government of Poland invited representatives of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service to Poland to teach Polish tax collectors how to col-
lect taxes. Many Americans who learned of this invitation were horrified at
such a prospect. The Internal Revenue Service is one of the least freedom
loving of all government bureaucracies. It has been known to confiscate and
destroy or sell assets with little or no due process. Yet Poland and other coun-
tries want to copy U.S. policies and methods.
ROBERT WN. McGEE, A TRADE POLICY FOR FREE SOCIETIES: THE CASE AGAINST PROTEC-
TIONISNI 160 (1994).
107. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE &JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 220 (3d
ed. 2001) (defining "soft power" as "the ability to get desired outcomes because others
want what you want"); JOSEPH S. NYE, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY TIE
WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T Do IT ALONE Xvi (2002) (noting the increasing im-
portance of soft power).
108. Jim Litke, How Times Have Changed for U.S., CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Sept. 7,
2002, at D3 ("There's [sic] 183 countries and 3 billion people watching these games.
And somewhere out there now is a 13-year-old who wants to be a Michael, a Magic, a
Larry or a Patrick." (quoting Chuck Daly, coach of the 1992 Dream Team)); see also id.
("Ten years ago, explaining the difference between USA basketball and the rest of the
world was simple. The United States had MichaelJordan. Everyone else had guys wear-
ing Air Jordans. Man, how times have changed.").
109. See sources cited supra n.105.
110. LAFEBER, supra n.19, at 19.
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ter all, the more a country succeeds in exporting its ideas and
concepts, the more likely these ideas and concepts will be
adopted abroad. In turn, these exports might level the playing
field and enhance the competitiveness of the importing coun-
tries. With commitment and dedication, the importing coun-
tries might even be able to improve the ideas and challenge the
U.S. market, or even to establish them as international standards
or staple goods."'
A decade ago, when the FIBA first allowed professional play-
ers to play in the Olympics, many wondered if that was a mis-
take.112 Skeptics pointed to the thirty- or forty-point losses for-
eign teams suffered at the mercy of the American Dream Teams.
However, as the gap between U.S. basketball and the rest of the
world reduces,"'l commentators begin to appreciate the fore-
sight of the FIBA executives. Like the kid who plays with bigger
guys, the international game has improved its level of competi-
tion by including NBA players." 4
Today, the NBA has many fine overseas players: Vlade Divac
and Peja Stojakovic from Yugoslavia, Pau Gasol from Spain, An-
drei Kirilenko from Russia, Steve Nash from Canada, Dirk
Nowitzki from Germany, Tony Parker from France, and Hedo
Turkoglu from Turkey." 5 These players are not just backups
111. Fran Blinebury, It's Time for Some Soul-Searching in the NBA, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Sept. 7, 2002, at 4 (comparing basketball to other American exports: "This is how it
happened with TVs and radios, automobiles and VCRs. We gave them the know-how
and then they turned around and took over our market with greater commitment,
more dedication to quality in the task.").
112. Steve Bulpett, U.S. Boosts International Game, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 8, 2002, at
B8:
Those of you who haven't understood why international teams wanted to play
the NBA's best and not a bunch of college kids - regardless of the result -
ought to understand now. You can only beat the best if you play the best.
Teams were right to absorb 60-point whippings in '92, knowing better days
were ahead.
Id.
113. For an excellent chronology of the erosion of U.S. global basketball
supremacy, see Wolff, supra n.5.
114. See Wilbon, supra n.9 (commending the foresight of "that the only way they
could raise the level of their game was to play on the same floor with the best - like the
young kid in the park who plays with the bigger guys").
115. Compare the following statistics:
In 1946-47, the league's inaugural season, five players from four countries and
territories were in the NBA. In 1988-89, 20 from 15 countries and territories
existed. By the 1991-92 season, those numbers had increased to 23 players
from 18 countries and territories. It escalated to a league-record 52 interna-
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whom nobody recognizes, but proven stars who start for their
NBA teams. Three of them were selected to represent the
league's very best in the 2002 All-star Game,' 16 and most recently
Yao Ming, the 7-foot-5 Chinese center, was selected first in the
NBA draft.1 17  Starting this season, Manu Ginobili, Pepe
Sanchez, and Ruben Wolkowysky, the three Argentine players
who helped end the United States' 58-0 winning streak, will play
for the San Antonio Spurs," 8 the Detroit Pistons, 1 9 and the Bos-
ton Celtics, 12 respectively.
Similar progress was made on intellectual property protec-
tion in less developed countries. In the past, less developed
countries were skeptical of intellectual property and regarded it
as an exploitative device that drains less developed countries of
their scarce resources 121 and slows down their economies and
catch-up processes. 1 22 Some of them also considered intellectual
tional players on opening day of the 2001-02 season, before finishing at 51
from 30 countries and territories at the end of the regular season.
Since 17 of the top 57 picks in June's NBA draft were. European players,
the number of Europeans in the league is expected to eclipse 60 for the first
time in league history when the season opens Oct. 29.
Stephen A. Smith, Team USA Missing the Team Part, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 8, 2002; see
also Litke, supra n.108 (noting that "[flive of the 10 rookies on the first- and second-
team All-Rookie squads were non-Americans [and that] Pau Gasol was rookie of the
year").
116. Steve Nash, Dirk Nowitzki, and Peja Stojakovic played in 2002 All-Star Game.
NBA All-Star 2002 Participants, NBA.coM, at http://www.nba.com/allstar2002/partici
pants.html.
117. Mike Wise, The Home Team Provides the Intrigue, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at
D1.
118. Litke, supra n.108.
119. Chris McCosky, Pistons Defend Title, All They Have Gained, DETROIT NEWS, Sept.
30, 2002, at 2D.
120. The Official Site of the Boston Celtics, Celtics Sign Wolkowyski (Sept. 16, 2002),
at http://www.nba.com/celtics/news/Wolkowyski_091602.html.
121. Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership ofInformation in a Global
Economy, 27 GEO. 'WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 331 (1994) ("As with the importation
of capital, developing countries often view the importation of intellectual property as a
means of dominating and exploiting the economic potential of the importing country.
Paying for imports or royalties is thus seen as an economic burden fostering a negative
balance of trade.").
122. But see Robert P. Merges, Battle of the Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade,
8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 239, 246 (1990) (noting the growth of the Hong Kong recording in-
dustry and the Indian software industry after improved copyright protection); Robert
M. Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the World, in
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra n.58, at 68, 72 (noting a
large increase of patent applications filed by Mexican nationals after Mexico reformed
its patent law in 1991); id. (noting that, since Colombia started providing copyright
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property rights to be tools to protect competitive advantage of
the developed world by concentrating intellectual property own-
ership in enterprises based in developed countries, 21 while co-
vertly transferring valuable cultural resources out of less devel-
oped countries. 124
Today, however, many leaders realize the benefits of intel-
lectual property rights, in particular their positive impact on for-
eign investment, 25 taxes, 12 6 creation of jobs, 12 7 and transfer of
protection to software in 1989, "[m]ore than 100 Colombian nationals have since pro-
duced application software packages that have been registered with the copyright of-
fice, with hundreds more written but not registered"); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra
n.17, at 192 (noting that effective intellectual property protection will promote the de-
velopment of indigenous industries and technologies); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspec-
tives, supra n.17, at 63 (same).
123. Frederick M. Abbott, The WI'O TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Develop-
ment, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION 39, 46 (Frederick M.
Abbott & DavidJ. Gerber eds., 1997) (noting that less developed countries argued that
intellectual property rights "will lead to or embed a stratification and concentration of
[intellectual property rights] ownership" in enterprises based in industrialized coun-
tries).
124. See Bellagio Declaration, supra n.70 (declaring that contemporary intellectual
property law denies protection to people who do not fit the author-centered model,
such as "custodians of tribal culture and medical knowledge, collectives practicing tradi-
tional artistic and musical forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable seed varieties"); see
also BOYLE, supra n.60, at 2 (arguing that Western intellectual property systems tend to
disproportionately favor industrialized countries while ignoring the interests of less de-
veloped countries which supplied the indigenous cultural materials); Yu, From Pirates to
Partners, supra n.17, at 241 (emphasizing the importance of granting protection to rare
and irreplaceable raw materials like folkloric works, works of cultural heritage, and bio-
logical and ecological know-how of traditional peoples); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspec-
tives, supra n.17, at 86 (same). But see Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment
on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
229, 271 (1998) (contending that "copyright laws can form the first line of defense in
protecting indigenous culture and still comply with TRIPS standards").
125. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (1994); Antonio Medina Mora Icaza, The Mexi-
can Software Industry, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra
n.58, at 232, 236 ("Intellectual property rights protection in a country is a way to seek
the trust of foreign investors in the country that will allow its economy to grow.");
Lagerqvist & Riley, supra n.98, at 8 (listing the loss of foreign investment and know-how
as a cost of counterfeiting); Josh Martin, Copyright Law Reforms Mean Better Business Cli-
mate, J. COM., Mar. 7, 1996, at IC (reporting on a World Bank survey that demonstrates
the correlation between intellectual property rights and foreign investment); A.R.C.
Westwood, Preface, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra n.58,
at v, vi ("Clearly, a company will not be enthusiastic about doing business in a country
unwilling to provide protection for the intellectual content of its products - a concern
now facing U.S. businesses as they evaluate opportunities in the former Soviet Union.");
Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n.17, at 192 (noting that effective intellectual property
protection can attract foreign investment); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra
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technology. 121 If these countries continue to improve their intel-
lectual property system, they eventually might catch up, or even
be able to compete, with the developed world. While the United
States might have aggressively exported intellectual property
laws to promote its economic interests, 129 its success in exporting
n.17, at 63 (same); see also Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment
Stimulation: The Rating of Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261 (1997)
(using foreign investment as one of the variables in measuring intellectual property
protection in a less developed country); Mickey Mouse Back in China, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
1993, at D4 (reporting that Disney brought Mickey Mouse back to China after a self-
imposed four-year absence due to copyright infringements). But see A. Samuel Oddi,
The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 831, 849 ("In the complex decisionmaking process of whether to invest in a foreign
country, the availability of patent protection seems unlikely to be a determinative fac-
tor."); McManis, supra n.56, at 1289 (noting the lack of "empirical support for the pro-
position that increased levels of intellectual property protection in the developing
world will necessarily lead to increased levels of foreign investment in developing coun-
tries").
126. See Lagerqvist & Riley, supra n.98, at 9; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONTRIBU-
TION OF THE SOF-WARE INDUSTRY TO THE CHINESE ECONOMY 4 (1998), available at http://
www.bsa.org/usa (estimating that a sixty percent decrease in piracy would translate into
more than $466 million in tax receipts).
127. See Lagerqvist & Riley, supra n.98, at 9; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n.17,
at 192 (noting that effective intellectual property protection can create jobs); Yu, Piracy,
Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra n. 17, at 63 (same); see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
supra n.126, at 4 (estimating that a sixty percent decrease in piracy would translate into
more than 79,000 jobs).
128. See MANSFIELD, supra n.125, at 20 (noting that "the strength or weakness of a
country's system of intellectual property protection seems to have a substantial effect,
particularly in high-technology industries, on the kinds of technology transferred by
many U.S. firms to that country"); SELL, supra n.58, at 214 (arguing that an operational
intellectual property regime will promote technology transfer); Edmund W. Kitch, The
Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 175-76 (1994) (same);
Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n.17, at 192 (noting that effective intellectual property
protection can facilitate technology transfer); Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra
n.17, at 63 (same).
129. SeeJ. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property - America's Overlooked Export, 20
U. DAYrON L. REV. 809 (1995) (discussing the need to protect intellectual property
rights in an era when information products constitute a major sector of the U.S. econ-
omy); Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n. 17, at 130; see also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
OF EAST ASIA 9 (Alan S. Gutterman & Robert Brown eds., 1997) (noting that the share
of intellectual property-based exports in the United States has doubled since the Sec-
ond World War); R. Michael Gadbaw & Rosemary E. Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights in
the New GATT Round, in GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?, supra n.64, at 38, 45
("The new reality is that the U.S. economy is increasingly dependent for its competitive-
ness on its ability to protect the value inherent in intellectual property. United States
exports are increasingly weighted toward goods with a high intellectual property con-
tent."); Bruce A. Lehman, Speech Given at the Inaugural Engelberg Conference on Culture and
Economics of Participation in an International Intellectual Property Regime, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 211, 211 (1997) (observing that "[m]any Americans have begun to derive
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these laws eventually might hurt the country by reducing the
competitiveness of its products and enlarging its trade deficit.13 °
LESSON 4: THE GLOBAL VISION
Team USA's recent losses in the World Championships have
demonstrated the need to have a global vision and the impor-
tance of understanding the opposition. In the past, the United
States could easily gather some of its best players and put on an
all-star show en route to the basketball throne. Today, this is not
the case. The U.S. players no longer can use their sheer
strength, athleticism, and instincts to beat their opponents. 131
While they might still be able to beat their opponents by a mar-
gin of twenty or thirty points by using their best players, they risk
embarrassment, as shown in the recent World Championships, if
those players are not playing or if they do not have enough prep-
aration. Thus, to improve the team's understanding of their op-
ponents, some commentators noted the need to institute a
scouting system, 32 hire a full-time national coach,' 33 and in-
their livelihoods from products of their minds, as opposed to products of manual labor,
and much of [its] gross domestic product is attributable to new information and en-
tertainment-based industries which have an interest in protecting their valuable prod-
ucts through intellectual property rights").
130. The trade deficit between China and the United States was one of the major
reasons for the coercive U.S. foreign intellectual property policy toward China. SeeYu,
From Pirates to Partners, supra n.17, at 136-51 (tracing the United States' coercive policy
during the 1980s and early 1990s); see also Gana, supra n.50, at 119 (noting that
"[i]nternational intellectual property has become, primarily, the mechanism for re-
dressing trade deficits and for maintaining a competitive edge in global markets").
131. See Deveney, supra n.15 (opining that "[f]rom here on, international tourna-
ments will not be American All-Star cakewalks"); Weiss, supra n.72 (noting that the
United States "can no longer out-talent the competition unless it convinces the NBA's
best players to participate in a summer event after a long season"); Alexander Wolff,
U.S. Failed to Respect Game, Opponents, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED ONLINE (Dec.2, 2001), at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/inside-game/alexander-wolfff/news/2002/09/06/
hoop_life/ (reminiscing that "[g]one forever are the days when a U.S. team, by dint of
the letters across the front of its jerseys, will by birthright field the most talent, and
prevail simply by showing up and playing hard enough").
132. See Deveney, supra n.15 (discussing the need to develop a scouting system).
As a sports columnist explained:
When Argentina left the Americans defenseless by running an endless pro-
gression of picks, the U.S. team reacted as though it had been caught off
guard. "They were doing all kinds of things we were not expecting out there,"
says forward Elton Brand.
Problem is, Argentina always has played that way. The message just failed
to get to the American players. They underestimated the Argentine players,
too. As Pistons director of international scouting Tony Ronzone says: "Most
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crease awareness of international games.'34
As the world becomes increasingly interdependent, we no
longer can afford to ignore foreign countries by using a "go it
alone" policy. Consider international trade, for example. Dur-
ing the post-war period, some less developed countries took a
radical approach by isolating themselves from the international
trading system, which, they argued, was biased toward industrial-
ized countries. 35 While many South American countries prac-
ticed import substitution 13 6 and provided large subsidies to local
industries,' 37 China took an extreme approach by launching the
Great Leap Forward Movement,'38 withdrawing completely from
the global economy.'39 By the late 1980s, however, virtually all of
these countries have abandoned their ill-advised strategies. 40 In
the case of China, its self-reliant development strategy had led to
high-cost and ineffective domestic production, and the country
remained backward, possessing very limited foreign technology
coaches and scouts know Manu Ginobili and Ruben Wolkowysky, but they
don't know Argentina can bring Andres Noccioni off the bench. The people
who are out there all the time, watching these players, watching teams, they
know."
Id.
133. See Deveney, supra n.15 (discussing the need to hire a full-time national
coach to "learn the rules of the international game ... [and] become familiar with
international referees and the opposition"); May, supra n.15 (discussing the need to
"hire a national coach who knows not only the international game, but also the interna-
tional players").
134. Enlund, supra n.4 (noting that "the U.S. is generally uneducated in interna-
tional competition other than the Olympics"); id. ("In the U.S., it's pretty much the
Olympics, the NBA Finals, the NCAA and the high school tournaments. [The World
Championship] has been a different kind of competition. People are not familiar with
it because it has never been here." (quoting Tom Jernstedt, the president of USA Bas-
ketball)); May, supra n.15 (criticizing the lack of priorities in the World Championship
in the United States: "In the United States, it's the Olympics and nothing else. Every-
where else, it's the World Championships because it's all about one sport. It's the
World Cup of basketball").
135. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra n.48, at 576.
136. BARRY B. HUGHES, CONTINUITYAND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS: THE CLASH OF
PERSPECrivEs 374 (2d ed. 1994). "Import substitution is a policy of producing domesti-
cally as much as possible of that which a country traditionally imported." Id.
137. See id.
138. See IMMANUEL C.Y. Hs0, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 655-58 (6th ed. 2000), for
a discussion of the Great Leap Forward Movement in China.
139. SeeYu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n.17, at 198 (discussing China's mistaken
withdrawal from the global economy).
140. HUGHES, supra n.136, at 374 (noting that, by the late 1980s, "most countries
had concluded that import substitution was not working (or that they had sheltered the
nascent industries long enough)").
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and capital. 4'
In today's globalized economy, international cooperation is
particularly needed to deal with cross-border problems.14 2 By fa-
cilitating communication and coordination, international coop-
eration not only will enable governments to obtain information
that is essential to effective action on cross-border issues, 143 but
also will help governments understand the interests they share
with other governments. Such cooperation also will enhance the
chances of cooperation in areas in which governments otherwise
would act unilaterally.1 44
This need for global cooperation is particularly evident in
the development of the international intellectual property sys-
tem. Traditionally, intellectual property lawmaking is a matter
of domestic affairs. Without external interference, governments
make value judgments as to what would best promote the crea-
tion and dissemination of intellectual works in their own coun-
tries. As a result, these disparate judgments often reflect the
country's level of wealth, economic structure, technological ca-
pability, political system, and cultural tradition. 141
Although bilateral and multilateral treaties allow countries
to adjust their intellectual property systems in exchange for bet-
ter protection abroad,1 46 policymakers often evaluate these ad-
141. Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n. 17, at 198; see also William T. Pendley, China
as International Actor, in BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE: STRATEGIES FOR U.S. RE-
LATIONS WITH CHINA 19, 27 (Kim R. Holmes &JamesJ. Przystup eds., 1997) (explaining
why China needs to integrate with the global economy).
142. Examples of these problems include terrorism, drug trafficking, refugees, ille-
gal immigration, environmental degradation, illegal arms sales, nuclear proliferation,
and bribery and corruption. SeeJudith H. Bello, National Sovereignty and Transnational
Problem Solving, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1027 (1996) (stating that "[mi]any of the most
difficult problems that challenge nation states in the increasingly interdependent world
do not respect borders .... Nation states acting alone are helpless to resolve or most
effectively alleviate these problems").
143. KEOHANE & NYE, supra n.107, at 291; Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra
n.48, at 606.
144. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra n.48, at 606 (noting that the cooper-
ative approach might result in countries revealing their substantial shared interests,
thus encouraging cooperation on issues that governments might otherwise act unilater-
ally).
145. RYAN, supra n.48, at 191; Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra n.17, at 239; Yu,
Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra n.17, at 84; Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach,
supra n.48, at 569.
146. For example, in the nineteenth century, bilateral agreements were used ex-
tensively to govern intellectual property relations in Europe. Prussia was the first coun-
try to enter into a bilateral copyright treaty. From 1827 to 1829, it entered into thirty-
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justments carefully to make sure that they correspond to the
country's socio-economic conditions, research and development
capabilities, and institutional and budgetary constraints. 147
Thus, most bilateral and multilateral intellectual property trea-
ties tend to focus on a limited range of issues. 48 Even when they
seek to harmonize protection by creating international mini-
mum standards, these treaties are designed with such flexibility
that allows governments "wiggle room" to develop their own in-
tellectual property systems.' 4
However, with increasing globalization and the establish-
ment of the WTO, the control of national governments over the
adoption and implementation of domestic intellectual property
laws has been greatly reduced. Indeed, international lawmaking
has begun to replace country-based assessments and domestic
policymaking as the predominant mode of intellectual property
lawmaking. Through a global process, governments collectively
design an international intellectual property system that takes
into consideration the diverging interests, histories, cultures,
and traditions of the various members of the international com-
munity. 5 °
two bilateral agreements with other German States. 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 44 (1938). In 1840, Austria
and Sardinia became the first autonomous States to enter into a bilateral copyright
agreement. Predominant powers like France and Great Britain soon followed. Id. By
the middle of the nineteenth century, a network of bilateral copyright conventions be-
tween major European powers had been established. See Sam Ricketson, The Birth of the
Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 9, 12 (1986). In the 1880s, multilateral intel-
lectual property regimes emerged. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised in Paris, July 24, 1971, 828
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 188:3, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
147. See Peter K. Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Global Elites: An Intro-
duction, 10 CARDOZOJ. INr'L & COMp. L. (forthcoming 2002).
148. For discussions of the different characteristics of bilateral and multilateral in-
tellectual property regimes, see, for example, DORIS ESTELLE LONG & ANTHONY
D'AMATO, A COURSEBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 284 (2000); PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 95-141
(2001); INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 219 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris
Estelle Long eds., 1997); Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information
in a Global Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 339-40 (1994). See also
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 57-60 (Graeme Dinwoodie et
al. eds., 2001) (discussing the negotiation of intellectual property treaties).
149. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra n.146; Paris Convention, supra n.146.
150. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWMAKING AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
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In the context of international copyright laws, national leg-
islation has largely given way to a supranational code, and the
networked model has increasingly replaced the patchwork
model lawmakers traditionally apply.15"' As Professor Jane Gins-
burg pointed out insightfully:
"International copyright" can no longer accurately be de-
scribed as a "bundle" consisting of many separate sticks, each
representing a distinct national law, tied together by a thin
ribbon of Berne Convention supranational norms. Today's
international copyright more closely resembles a giant squid,
whose many national law tentacles emanate from but depend
on a large common body of international norms.152
Nevertheless, some national norms remain significant, par-
ticularly in areas where these norms have direct impact on the
country's labor and cultural policies or where the drafters of
(Peter K. Yu ed., forthcoming 2003) for a collection of essays discussing the changing
nature of intellectual property lawmaking.
151. Professor Geller elaborated on how media technologies have shifted the
patchwork model of intellectual property lawmaking to the network model:
Until recently, national laws of intellectual property, along with corresponding
markets, fit within the patchwork model. Now, media technologies are shift-
ing the marketplace to the network model.
Laws of intellectual property have formed a patchwork, country by coun-
try. Treaties in the field set out minimum rights, but in flexible terms so that
each right may be implemented with more or less discretion. Otherwise, these
treaties, starting with the Berne and Paris Conventions, provide for national
treatment, requiring each member-state to protect foreign treaty claimants
like domestic claimants. Thus, while differing from country to country, much
the same legal rules have governed most competitors in media and technology
markets within each set of borders. Industries have tended to group within
such borders: for example, publishers have gravitated to centers such as Paris,
London, and New York. Hard copies and products have been marketed out-
ward from such centers within national territories.
Now, however, markets are being globally networked. Computers are re-
leasing creation and production from the constraints of geographical space.
For example, they allow writers to ready text for publishing, composers to syn-
thesize music, and designers to shape products, all at their desk tops. Tele-
communication media, like the fax and the Internet, enable teams of creators
from the four corners of the earth to collaborate instantaneously across cyber-
space. The World Wide Web opens up new interactive channels between cre-
ators and producers, on the one hand, and mass and specialized markets, on
the other. More generally, the communication of media productions, market-
ing symbols, and technologies is being decentralized and enriched between
points of input and end-use.
Geller, From Patchwork to Network, supra n.82, at 70-71.
152. Ginsburg, International Copyright, supra n.79, at 289.
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multilateral instruments fail to reach a political consensus. 53
LESSON 5: THE PLAYERS' MIADSET
For most people, basketball is a very competitive sport. For
basketball addicts and die-hard NBA and NCAA fans, it is larger
than life. As a manufacturer would print on a T-shirt, "Basket-
ball Is Life. Just Hafta Play Basketball." However, to others, bas-
ketball is not only about competition. It is a sport for which peo-
ple have passion, an exercise that helps people improve phy-
sique, and a game that helps people, especially children and
youngsters, understand the need for teamwork and coordina-
tion.
Like basketball players, policymakers bring different mind-
sets to the playground. To resolve intellectual property disputes,
they generally use three different approaches. 154 The coercive
approach requires a part
, to use its strength or bargaining posi-
tion to force the other party to do what it otherwise would re-
fuse. 155 By contrast, the adversary approach calls for parties to
confront each other in an adjudicatory proceeding. 156 The only
approach that encourages parties to work together to resolve dis-
putes and differences is the cooperative approach.'5 7 Depend-
ing on the mindsets of the negotiators, this approach can result
in two distinctive outcomes. If negotiators have a zero-sum
mindset, i.e., they believe they are playing a zero-sum game in
which one country's gain necessarily results in another country's
loss, the cooperative approach will result in compromises. 1 5
However, if they have a nonzero-sum mindset, i.e., they believe
they are playing a nonzero-sum game in which a country's gain
does not necessarily result in another country's loss, the coopera-
tive approach may result in a forward-looking solution that pro-
vides mutual benefits for all the parties involved, 59 resolving the
dispute and preserving the hard-earned relationship between
153. See id.
154. See generally id. at 573-88 (discussing the various approaches used in resolving
intellectual property disputes).
155. See id. at 573-82 (discussing the coercive approach).
156. See id. at 582-86 (discussing the adversary approach).
157. See id. at 586-88 (discussing the cooperative approach).
158. See id. at 611 (discussing the difference between a compromise and a
nonzero-sum solution).
159. See id. (discussing the benefits of the nonzero-sum approach).
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the disputing parties. 60
In unilateral initiatives and bilateral treaties, the nature of
the conflict resolution approach is always apparent.' 6 ' For ex-
ample, nobody would mistake the coercive nature of a policy
that calls for unilateral trade sanctions or one imposing protec-
tive tariffs. Likewise, nobody would query the cooperative na-
ture of a policy that promotes technical assistance or the ex-
change of information between government authorities. How-
ever, when complex multilateral agreements, like the TRIPS
Agreement 16 2 or the 1996 WIPO Treaties, 163 are concerned, it is
much more difficult to determine the nature of the conflict reso-
lution approach used in the agreements.
Indeed, if we dissect the TRIPS Agreement, we will find that
all four approaches have been used in the Agreement.16 4 For
example, from the standpoint of less developed countries, the
minimum standards provisions of the Agreement are coercive by
nature. 165 As Professor Marci Hamilton pointed out, the TRIPS
Agreement was not designed only to correct the international
balance of trade or to lower customs trade barriers, but to "re-
make international copyright law in the image of Western copy-
right law."'166 In contrast, the dispute resolution provision em-
braces the adversary approach. 167 By mandating that disputes
arising under the Agreement be settled by the dispute settle-
ment procedure of the WTO, the TRIPS Agreement therefore
provides predictability and stability to the international intellec-
tual property system and deters signatory countries from cheat-
160. Id. at 587.
161. Id. at 573.
162. TRIPS Agreement, supra n.49.
163. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94
(Dec. 23, 1996); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996,
WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/95 (Dec. 23, 1996).
164. See Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra n.48, at 634-41 (discussing the
various dispute resolution approaches used in the TRIPS Agreement).
165. Id.
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ing on other Member States. 168
In addition, the TRIPS Agreement includes provisions that
reflect the cooperative approach. Unfortunately, not all cooper-
ative provisions result in a win-win solution; some merely result
in a compromise. For example, the transitional provisions 6 9 al-
locate losses between developed and less developed countries. 1
70
By contrast, those provisions that call for technical and financial
cooperation, 17 that require signatory countries to eliminate in-
ternational trade in intellectual property-infringing goods, 1
7 2
and that require the Council for TRIPS to review the implemen-
tation of the Agreement 73 reflect the nonzero-sum approach.
Given the increased emphasis on the knowledge-based
economy and information products, 174 understanding the differ-
ent approaches and the mindsets of the global players becomes
particularly important. By doing so, one not only will gain in-
168. See Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra n.48, at 584-85 (discussing the
benefits of the NITO dispute settlement mechanism).
169. TRIPS Agreement, supra n.49, art. 65-66, 33 I.L.M. at 1222. Article 65 of the
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tional period. TRIPS Agreement, supra n.49, art. 65(1)-(3), 33 1.L.M. at 1222. Likewise,
Article 66 provides least developed countries with an eleven-year transitional period. Id.
art. 66(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1222. To help create "a sound and viable technological base" in
these countries, Article 66 further requires developed countries to provide incentives
for their businesses and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to
least developed countries. Id. art. 66(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
170. See Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra n. 48, at 639.
171. Article 67 of the Agreement requires developed countries to provide techni-
cal and financial cooperation to less and least developed countries "on request and on
mutually agreed terms and conditions." TRIPS Agreement, supra n.49, art. 67, 33 I.L.M.
at 1222. Such cooperation includes "assistance in the preparation of laws and regula-
tions on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the
prevention of their abuse, and . . . support regarding the establishment or reinforce-
ment of domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters, including the training
of personnel." Id. at 1222-23.
172. Article 69 of the Agreement requires all signatory countries to cooperate with
each other to eliminate international trade in intellectual property-infringing goods by
establishing and notifying contact points in their governments, exchanging information
on trade in infringing goods, and promoting cooperation between their customs au-
thorities. Id. art. 69, 33 I.L.M. at 1223.
173. To allow for further cooperation and coordinated decisionmaking, article
71 (1) of the Agreement requires the Council for TRIPS to review the implementation
of the Agreement at two-year intervals after the expiration of the transitional period
and in light of any relevant new developments that might warrant modification or
amendment of the agreement. d. art. 71(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1224.
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sight into the effectiveness and future prospects of the dispute
resolution arrangement, 175 but also will become better prepared
to react to proposals, make adjustments, and ultimately preserve
delicate relationships.
CONCLUSION
In the recent World Men's Basketball Championships in In-
dianapolis, Team USA found out painfully that the international
game is very different from what they play at home and that the
gap between USA Basketball and the rest of the world has been
closing. While the United States' losses might have a significant
impact on how the country will prepare for the 2004 Olympics in
Athens and on how Americans train youngsters to play basket-
ball, their teachings go beyond basketball.
The international harmonization process is a game with dif-
ferent rules, different officials, and players with different visions
and mindsets. By watching how players interact with rules, offi-
cials, and other players, one therefore could gain insight into
globalization and the international harmonization process.
Team USA's recent loss might be a painful lesson to Americans,
but it provides a beneficial lesson to all of us who are involved in
intellectual property and international trade.
175. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach, supra n.48, at 571.
